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Abstract: 
A series of recent debates in experimental economics have associated demand effects with the 
artificiality of the experimental setting and have linked it to the problem of external validity.  In this 
paper we argue that these associations can be misleading, partly because of the ambiguity with 
which “artificiality” has been defined, but also because demand effects and external validity are 
related in complex ways. We argue that artificiality (understood as unfamiliarity of the experimental 
environment) may be directly as well as inversely correlated with demand effects. We also 
distinguish between the demand effects of experimentation and the reactions that they may trigger 
and that might endanger experimental validity. We conclude that economists should pay more 
attention to the way in which subjects construe the experimental task, and learn to exploit subjects’ 
reactivity to expectations in their experiments. 
 
 
1 The problem of artificiality 
 
The argument that the artificiality of the laboratory setting constitutes a serious methodological 
problem has a distinguished history in experimental economics. A classic statement can be found in 
a commentary written by Allen Wallis and Milton Friedman on one of the earliest laboratory 
experiments on demand theory.1 Wallis and Friedman argued that 
 
It is questionable whether a subject in so artificial an experimental situation could know what 
choices he would make in an economic situation; not knowing it is almost inevitable that he 
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1  The experiments were reported in Thurstone (1931). On early experiments in demand theory, see Moscati 
(2007). 
  2 
would, in entire good faith, systematize his answers in such a way as to produce plausible but 
spurious results (Wallis and Friedman 1942: 179). 
The Wallis-Friedman argument struck a chord, fuelling economists’ scepticism about laboratory 
experiments for decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, pioneers like Vernon Smith (1982) and Charles 
Plott (1991) responded to this scepticism arguing that experiments are mainly valuable as tests of 
economic theories, and any theory that has been refuted in the laboratory is unsatisfactory because it 
fails to be universally valid.2 The appeal of this argument, however, is limited in a discipline that, 
like economics, does not aim at capturing universal laws of nature.3 Thus unsurprisingly, in spite of 
the success of experimental economics and its integration within the discipline, the artificiality 
worry has not disappeared. According to Arthur Schram, for example, 
 
A major obstacle to the external validity of an experiment is the artificiality of the setting. If 
the laboratory institutions and incentives do not sufficiently mirror those of the outside-the-
laboratory situation they intend to study, the loss of external validity may be significant 
(Schram 2005: 226). 
 
“Artificiality” is a vague notion. Although sometimes it is used to refer to the abstract nature of the 
experimental task, it is often used to refer to anything that is different in the experiment and its 
target in the “real world” (see Schram as an example), and is seen as putting validity at risk.4 
Validity, strictly speaking, is the property of an inference from experimental evidence to a claim or 
hypothesis. According to a standard definition, an inference is internally valid when it is correct and 
the hypothesis concerns mechanisms and causes that are at work within the laboratory setting; it is 
externally valid when it is correct and the hypothesis refers to causes and mechanisms that are 
operative in some non-laboratory situation of interest.5 The artificiality worry thus concerns a 
                                                 
2  See also Wilde (1981: 143), Loomes (1989: 173), Hey (1991: 10). 
3  See e.g. Guala (2005: 147-160), Levitt and List (2007: 153-4). 
4  See also Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982), Mook (1983), Starmer (1999), Lucas (2003), Bardsley (2005), 
Bardsley et al (2010). 
5  Cf. Guala (2005), Bardsley (2005), Jimenez-Buedo and Miller (2010), Jones (2011). 
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specific way in which experimental data may lead us astray, or in which we could make an invalid 
inference from data to non-experimental causes. The worry is that experimenters may be studying 
tasks that are abstract and unfamiliar to participants. The behaviour of participants thus may be 
influenced by causal factors that are quite different from those that would be operative in other 
(more familiar) circumstances. An inference from data to non-laboratory causes could be seriously 
misguided, leading to identify decision processes that are of little relevance in most non-laboratory 
situations. 
 
Artificiality lately has also been associated with so-called “experimental demand effects”, or the 
behavioural changes that may be prompted by subjects’ awareness of being under study. Steve 
Levitt and John List for instance point out that 
 
humans, unlike Galileo’s rolling balls or Uranium239, know that they are participating in 
experiments. Making decisions in an artificial environment and general awareness of the fact 
that their actions are being observed and recorded might influence how people behave (2005: 
5).6 
 
Again, artificiality and subjects’ awareness are considered a threat to the validity of experimental 
results. The worry is that the behaviour observed in some laboratory experiments might tell us more 
about subjects’ reactions to experimenters’ demands, than about their motives when they face 
similar tasks in the “real world”. As an antidote, Levitt and List claim, economists should design 
field experiments in which subjects face familiar tasks and are unaware of being studied.  
 
In this paper we will examine critically the concept of artificiality and the way it has been used in 
the experimental literature. For ease of exposition, in the next section we introduce the Dictator 
                                                 
6  The paragraph that we are quoting has disappeared during the transition from working paper (Levitt and List 
2005) to published article (Levit and List 2007). We suspect that the cut was made for reasons of space, since the spirit 
of the published text is very much the same, and there is no reason to believe that the authors changed their mind on this 
matter. 
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Game, a paradigmatic experimental design which has been widely criticized for its artificiality but 
which nevertheless has enjoyed huge success over the last two decades. The Dictator Game will be 
used as an example and will help illustrate concretely some of the general methodological issues 
discussed in this paper. Section 3 addresses the relation between artificiality and demand effects.  
Our thesis is that, under a common interpretation of the term, the artificiality of the experimental 
setting and the effects that the awareness of participating in an experiment can have on the 
behaviour of subjects are related in complex ways, and that there is no reason to believe that – in 
general – artificiality or awareness affect the validity of experiments univocally. The subsequent 
section (section 4) offers an analysis of the broader phenomenon of reactivity and the conditions 
under which it can lead to experimental artefacts. Finally (sections 5 and 6), we will argue that the 
key to make valid inferences from experimental data lies not so much in eliminating demand effects 
as in retaining control over them, and understanding subjects’ reactions to expectations is crucial to 
achieve this goal. 
 
 
2 An example: the Dictator Game 
 
Imagine you are participating in an experiment: you are sitting in front of a computer terminal, 
surrounded by partitions that prevent you from seeing the other participants. A set of instructions 
describe the task that you will perform in the next few minutes. First, you will be matched randomly 
with another subject. Her identity will remain unknown to you, and your identity will be unknown to 
her. Then, you will be assigned different roles, labelled A and B. All B-participants will wait for A-
participants to make a decision. A-participants will see a small box appear in the middle of their 
computer screens, preceded by the following message: 
 
You have 20 euro in your account. You now have the opportunity to transfer some of this 
money to the account of a B-participant who has been matched randomly with you. How much 
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money would you like to transfer to the other participant? Write in the box a number from 0 to 
20 and press Continue. 
 
When A has made her decision, the experiment will end. At that point you will be given a sealed 
envelope with a participation fee of five euro plus the sum of money that is in your account. The 
instructions emphasize that your identity and the identity of the other participants will remain secret 
during and after the experiment, and that no one else will know what you have decided to do or how 
much money you have earned in the experiment. 
 
The setting we have just described is known as the Dictator Game, and is one of the best known 
designs in experimental social science.7 It has been replicated hundreds of times by economists, and 
over the last ten years it has also become increasingly popular in psychology, biology, and 
anthropology. In spite of its success, however, the Dictator Game is a controversial design. The 
results consistently show that roughly half of the dictators8 depart from the profit maximizing 
strategy and choose to give some money to the recipients, the mean allocation being 20% of the 
initial endowment. Moreover, a consistent minority of dictators choose to split the sum in two equal 
parts (cf. Camerer 2003). 
 
It is not clear how these results should be explained. According to some social scientists, behaviour 
in the Dictator Game shows that people are not the selfish income-maximizers postulated in many 
economic models: they are willing to benefit other individuals even if it is costly, and their 
preferences have a “social” or “other-regarding” element.9 Others disagree: they claim that the 
behaviour observed in Dictator Games cannot be used to draw inferences about people’s 
preferences, because it is an “experimental artefact”. The choices made by dictators are caused by 
                                                 
7  Kahneman et al (1986) and Forsythe et al (1994) are generally considered the seminal papers on the Dictator 
Game. For a meta-analysis see Engel (2011), and for a methodological overview see Guala and Mittone (2010). 
8  The dictators are “A-subjects”, in the terminology above. Experimental instructions avoid loaded terms such as 
“dictator” and try to use a terminology that is as neutral as possible. B-subjects are known as “recipients” in the 
scientific literature. 
9  See e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002). 
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the peculiar circumstances in which the subjects are artificially placed (e.g. Levitt and List 2005, 
2007; List 2007, Bardsley 2008). 
 
The sceptics seem to have a point: in spite of its simplicity, the Dictator Game is a really odd 
situation. Although we always have the opportunity to give money to strangers, we rarely receive a 
sum especially for this purpose (from another stranger!); and we are rarely told that there is an 
anonymous individual with whom we could share some of this windfall money. The hypothesis that 
subjects find the situation perplexing therefore is not far-fetched. The “oddness” of the situation is 
due to two separate causes: on the one hand, the unfamiliarity of the environment; on the other, the 
fact that the subjects are under experimental scrutiny. Both features, moreover, are potentially 
problematic because human subjects are aware of the situation they are in: awareness may induce 
subjects to comply with the “demands” of the experimenter, invalidating the inferences that the 
latter will make. 
 
In the course of the paper we will refer frequently to Dictator Game experiments to flesh out some 
interesting aspect of the artificiality problem. As we will do this, it is important to keep in mind that 
the Dictator Game is a special case for the reasons mentioned above. Nevertheless, we think that it is 
a useful case partly in virtue of its oddity, which explains why it has been extensively chosen as a 
case study to illustrate the problems of artificiality and demand effects. 
 
 
3 Task construal and demand effects of experimentation 
 
We owe the notion of demand effects of experimentation to the classic work of Martin Orne, the 
first psychologist who tried to study systematically the experimental situation as a social 
phenomenon. Orne investigated how participants, in their attempt to interpret the experimental 
context, try to guess the experiment's purpose and (often unconsciously) direct their behavior to fit 
  7 
that interpretation. As part of his theoretical contribution, he coined the notion of “demand 
characteristics of experimentation” (Orne, 1962, 1969) to refer to the set of cues, instructions, and 
interactions that define any experiment and that subjects use to direct their behaviour. The crucial 
idea behind Orne’s concept is that a number of cues and instructions are not explicitly designed but 
instead emerge spontaneously from the interaction between subject and experimenter. These cues, 
therefore, may not be under direct experimental control. Their behavioral consequences are the 
demand effects of experimentation.  
 
A crucial source of demand effects is task construal: in experiments that provide unfamiliar 
scenarios subjects look for cues that facilitate the interpretation of the task. According to a radical 
interpretation, all experimental instructions are necessarily incomplete; subjects must always 
evaluate the circumstances and fill the gaps using whatever environmental cues and previous 
experiences that share some elements with the current situation. They, in a sense, construe “their 
own” experimental task.  
 
Although experimental cues may be unintended, their behavioural effects  can be studied 
empirically, at least in principle. This idea has a long standing tradition in social psychology, and 
recently has received attention in experimental economics as well. In the case of the Dictator Game, 
for example, it is possible to manipulate the basic design in such a way as to send different cues 
about the purpose of the task, while maintaining the same structure of economic incentives. Bardsley 
(2008) for instance has designed an experiment in which dictators, in addition to giving, can choose 
to take money from recipients. In all of his treatments a significant number of dictators choose to 
take from, rather than give money to, their experimental counterparts. Bardsley interprets this as an 
artefact of experimentation: both in his game and in the standard Dictator Game subjects are 
reacting to the cues that the protocol supplies about what constitutes “appropriate” behaviour. When 
the experiment (the standard Dictator Game) seems to be about giving, subjects give. When the 
experiment (Bardsley’s  Dictator Game variant) seems to be about taking, subjects feel free to take 
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from recipients.10 
 
The notions of demand effect and task construal are useful tools to analyse experiments like the 
Dictator Game. Both have the advantage of emphasising the active role played by subjects in the 
interpretation of experiments. To the extent that “artificiality” can create methodological difficulties, 
these are not based on the fact that the task is abstract or unfamiliar, but on the rather general 
problem that, as any other element in the setting, it can prompt reactions that depend on subjects’ 
uncontrolled interpretations of the task. The problem is, though, as we shall see, that familiar tasks 
can also give rise to uncontrolled interpretations on the part of subjects. Since the subjects engage 
with tacit and explicit instructions provided by the experimenters, the latter obviously play some 
role in inducing the behaviour that is observed in the laboratory. But it would be fallacious to 
consider the behaviour as determined or “implied” by the experimental task only. 
 
Daniel Zizzo (2010) has tried to construct a comprehensive framework for the analysis of the 
interaction between the task and its interpretation using the concept of “experimenter’s demand 
effect”. Zizzo defines these effects as 
 
changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes appropriate 
behavior (behavior ‘demanded’ from them). (2010: 75) 
 
Zizzo classifies demand effects on the basis of whether subjects correctly or incorrectly guess the 
true goal of the experiment. Thus, depending on the coincidence between what the subjects believe 
about the experiment and what the experiment really is meant to test, we have three possible cases:   
 
(1) Uncorrelated expected and true objectives. 
(2) Negatively correlated expected and true objectives. 
                                                 
10  For similar effects, see also Dana et al (2007), List (2007), Zizzo and Fleming (2014). 
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(3) Positively correlated expected and true objectives. 
  
Zizzo argues that in the first case, in which subjects’ expectations regarding the goals of the 
experiment are orthogonal to the real objectives, demand effects do not pose a threat to the validity 
of experimental inference. The second case, in which subjects’ guesses are opposite to the 
experimental objectives, does not constitute a problem for validity either: whatever effect we 
observe we can attribute to the treatment, minus the effect of the experimenter’s demand.11 Only the 
third case is truly problematic according to Zizzo: demand effects in this case act as a confound, 
preventing the researcher from distinguishing the causal role of the treatment from that of the 
demand. This is the case of the standard Dictator Game: the experimenter’s demand is correlated 
with the true purpose of the experiment, because subjects can easily guess that the experiment is 
about “giving”. 
 
Zizzo’s framework emphasises the question of whether the experiment provides cues to subjects 
about its purpose. The formulation in terms of correlation between true and expected objectives, 
however, is not entirely satisfactory. 
 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that the expectations of the experimenter can be identified 
correctly,12 it is not clear what behavioural implications such a correlation would have. Zizzo says 
that “correlation” means “correlation between actions implied by the expected objectives and 
actions implied by the true experiment objectives” (2011: 86, n. 16). For example, an experiment 
where subjects have the opportunity to give money – as in the standard dictator’s game – would 
                                                 
11  It should be noticed, however, that there may be “false negatives” – the treatment may seem to have no effect, 
where in fact it has been counterbalanced by the experimenter’s demand. And even in case of a positive effect, its size 
could be systematically underestimated. 
12  One problem  is that the relationship between the topic that the experimenter is studying and the intentions of 
the experimenter may be rather loose. For example, in some between-subjects experiment it can be virtually impossible 
to guess what the experimental manipulation is, and hence to infer what the “appropriate” or “expected” behaviour 
might be. Experiments are run “between subjects” when different treatments are administered to different groups, and 
“within subjects” when the same sample of subjects is administered all the treatments. In the first case, each subject has 
the opportunity to observe only part of the experiment and therefore cannot reliably infer what the hypothesis under test 
might be. 
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naturally imply the action “give”. But notice that the goals of the experimenter are only one side of 
the coin, and by themselves do not have any specific behavioural consequences: the motives of the 
subjects play a crucial role as well. In order to figure out whether the behaviour of the subjects is 
likely to change in response to the experimental stimulus, and how, we must pay attention to the 
way in which subjects react to the perceived experimental goals. 
 
 
4 Reactivity and control 
 
Following a terminology that is common in social psychology, we shall call reactivity the 
phenomenon that occurs when individuals alter their behaviour because of the awareness of being 
studied.13 Reactivity is intimately related to the notion of demand effect of experimentation, but we 
argue that it has some conceptual advantages that make it more suitable to methodological 
theorizing. One important advantage is its neutrality regarding the behavioural outcome of the task. 
While the term “demand effect” is often used to refer to the phenomenon of active task construal, it 
is also (more often than not) used to refer to the biases that task construal may introduce in the 
experimenters’ interpretation of results. Reactivity has less of a negative connotation, and allows us 
to identify the phenomenon independently of whether it creates methodological problems or not.  
 
Reactivity can take many forms, which may have different implications for the validity of 
experimental inferences. Here we focus on three reactive mechanisms that may in principle operate 
alternatively, or in conjunction: 
 
(i) Puzzle solving: when confronted with the experimental situation, subjects tend to conceive of 
their role as one in which a puzzle must be solved. The puzzle may consist in finding out what one is 
supposed to do as subject, or what the experiment really is about. In addition, especially in the case 
                                                 
13  See e.g. Adair (1984). 
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of experimental economics, some experiments look like abstract mathematical puzzles.  One way to 
comply with the experimenter’s demand, then, is to look for the optimal solution, where the 
optimum is defined by some logical or quasi-logical criterion. Clearly the search for an optimal 
solution requires that subjects form an opinion on the goal of the experiment (task construal) and 
thus, if the perceived objective coincides with the real objective, we may have an example of 
Zizzo’s third case. 
 
 (ii) Cooperative attitude: subjects may be motivated to solve a puzzle intrinsically (they like to 
solve puzzles) or by means of incentives (monetary, or otherwise): in the latter case they are 
motivated by a prize. But a further plausible motivation may be their desire to act according to what 
they think they are expected to do.14 To satisfy this motivation requires that subjects identify the 
goal of the experiment, and correctly infer what the experimenter would like to observe. Again, we 
may have an example of Zizzo’s third case. 
 
(iii) Evaluation apprehension: why would subjects want to give the experimenter the data that he is 
looking for? The simplest answer is that they want to make him happy. But another powerful 
motivation may be a desire to look good in the eyes of the experimenter. The demand effect in this 
case would not be triggered by subjects’ wish to attain what they think are the experimenter’s goals, 
but by their desire to convey a given image of themselves to the experimenter. In this more complex 
or strategic interaction the subject tries to guess the experiment’s goals and chooses a behavioural 
pattern that he or she thinks will project a positive image.  
 
Notice that subjects’ motivations become increasingly complex or layered as we move from (i) to 
(iii). The first mechanism only requires that subjects are motivated to find the “right” solution to the 
task; the second requires that they do it to please the experimenter; the third requires that they be 
                                                 
14  An opposite motivation may be the desire to disrupt these expectations, although psychologists tend to assume 
that this happens only rarely. 
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concerned with what the experimenter may infer about their skills or moral character, and that they 
act strategically in order to control that inference.  
 
Notice also that reactivity does not need to constitute, in itself, a source of experimental bias. A 
research artefact is normally defined as a systematic bias, uncontrolled and unintentional, that can 
threaten the validity (internal or external) of one’s conclusions (Strohmetz and Rosnow 2004). Thus, 
the reactivity of experimental subjects must be unregistered by the experimenter in order to 
constitute a research artefact. The relevant literature often displays a fair degree of confusion in this 
respect: all too often “artefacts” are used indistinctly (a) to refer to the phenomenon whereby 
subjects alter their behaviour due to the awareness of being studied, and (b) to refer to the inferential 
mistakes that this may cause.  
 
Another point worth stressing is that there is little reason to think that artificial designs are more 
likely to cause artefacts associated to reactivity or to demand characteristics: for example, 
experimenters are not in principle more likely to send uncontrolled cues that hint at the experimental 
purposes, just because the experimental situation is abstract or unfamiliar to subjects. On the 
contrary, an unfamiliar setting could be exploited to send more controlled cues to participants about 
the purposes of the experiment or the kind of behaviour that is expected. In a rich environment, 
subjects may react to a variety of stimuli, and the way in which they construe the task may become 
very difficult to predict (which is, incidentally, one of the reasons why experimental economists 
have traditionally privileged abstract designs). Therefore, an artificial setting does not seem to be, 
prima facie, more problematic in terms of the reactions it may trigger and their correct 
interpretations by researchers. It is perhaps important to stress once more that whatever cues the 
setting provides, they are to be considered problematic only in so far as they are sent inadvertently 
by the experimenter, i.e., only if the experimenter does not take them into account when he or she is 
interpreting subjects’ behaviour as a response to the treatment.  
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In sum, an artificial experimental environment per se does not need to make it more difficult for the 
experimenters to make valid inferences about the motives of subjects. The elements that can bias 
experimental results or cause researchers to make invalid inferences pertain to each individual 
design (and its relation to the background knowledge that motivates this design), but this seems to 
be orthogonal to the question of whether experimental designs involve familiar or unfamiliar tasks. 
 
Similarly, it is not clear how the artificiality or unfamiliarity of a given experimental setting may 
enhance the zealousness with which subjects obey instructions, the apprehension with which they 
face evaluation, or their reactions to the authority of experimenters. One could say, by the same 
token, that the more natural or recognizable the experimental task or situation, the more subjects 
may wonder about the researchers’ hidden motives, and the more zealousness, apprehension, or 
obedience/rebelliousness they will display. Human subjects may change their behaviour because 
they are under observation or scrutiny, regardless of whether they are engaged in a familiar or in an 
artificial experimental situation (think for example of the difficulty for people to display 
spontaneous patterns of behaviour when natural, physiological acts are being studied). 
 
The last point we would like to highlight is that whether or not reactive behaviour has the potential 
to bring about experimental bias seems to be unrelated, in principle, to whether subjects correctly 
guess the nature of the experimenter’s goals. Take mechanism (i) above, whereby subjects tend to 
conceive of the experimental context as containing a puzzle that they have to decipher. While 
Zizzo’s account suggests that a correlation between the expected and true objectives of an 
experiment is problematic, a perfect coincidence or matching between them can also be an antidote 
against bias: think of those experiments in which subjects are explicitly required and properly 
incentivised to perform a given task at their best level of their capacities. In these cases, perceived 
and real objectives of the experiments coincide, but there is no room for biasing effects, because 
subjects pursue the goals that the experimenter wants them to pursue (their best performance).   
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5 Expectations and norms 
 
We have argued that reactivity provides a powerful framework to analyse the problems that may be 
posed by “artificial” experiments. First, it allows us to separate the different mechanisms (both 
cognitive and motivational) of “demand effects”, and second, it provides a neutral terminology that 
does not ipso facto link subjects’ reactions to invalid inferences drawn from the experiment. Finally, 
we have pointed out that reactivity is a problem only when it goes undetected. In the rest of the 
paper we will argue that in order to avoid validity problems it is necessary to understand the 
mechanics of reactivity. What do subjects react to, exactly? 
 
One possible explanation of the behaviour observed in the standard Dictator Game and similar 
experiments, which has been extensively discussed in the literature, is that people care about the 
earnings of others. They may care about it directly – if they simply want to increase other people’s 
welfare – or indirectly – if they implement abstract principles of fairness concerning payoff 
distribution.15 If this is the case then the same results should be observed whenever the same 
distributional choices are being made, irrespective of how subjects construe the experimental task. 
 
There is extensive evidence however that subjects behave differently depending on whether their 
choices are known to others. In games where the payoffs are expressed in “chips” with different 
monetary values to each player, for example, many subjects are happy to simply pretend to be fair 
(by sharing the chips, but not the money, equally) if the other players do not know how much the 
chips are worth (Kagel et al. 1996). Other kinds of uncertainty – regarding, for example, the 
dictator’s responsibility for the outcome – also create a “moral wiggle room” that is exploited by 
experimental subjects for selfish purposes (Dana et al. 2007). 
 
                                                 
15  For a survey of the (large) literature on so-called “social preferences”, see for example Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006). 
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So it seems that people often care about others’ opinions, more than (or in addition to) others’ 
welfare. Subjects try to anticipate the expectations of a relevant audience, and adjust their behaviour 
in such a way as to not disappoint the audience. The audience in experiments like the Dictator Game 
is partly constituted by other subjects, if the latter know the distribution of payoffs. But it is also 
constituted by the experimenter, who is almost invariably informed (or has the means to find out) 
about subjects’ behaviour. In the latter case – and if subjects care about the expectations of the 
experimenter – there is clearly a potential for reactivity playing a role in subjects’ behavior. 
 
Note however that, despite what is often assumed in methodological discussions, the presence of an 
audience in itself is far from unusual or “artificial”. In many real-world situations our actions do 
take place in front of friends, colleagues, or just occasional bystanders, and accordingly our actions 
are influenced by what we think are their expectations about our behaviour. So the fact that subjects 
react to the expectations of a given audience should not necessarily be conceived as a threat to 
external validity. Notice also that artificiality and expectations are related in complex ways. There is 
a sense in which the artificiality of an experimental setting may actually hamper subjects’ reaction 
to other people’s expectations, because an unfamiliar situation can make it harder for the subjects to 
figure out what kind of expectations the audience might have. Those experimenters  who have 
bothered asking their subjects what behaviour they think is “appropriate” in the Dictator Game, for 
example, have found that the answers vary enormously and that a large proportion of subjects 
simply admit that they do not know (Bicchieri 2006: 126). 
 
These data suggest that what is potentially problematic about the interpretation of the standard 
Dictator Game is not so much “artificiality” or subjects’ reaction to an experimental “demand”, but 
that we do not fully understand how the task is construed by the experimental subjects. This in turn 
suggests that in behavioural experiments like the Dictator Game  one can learn a lot by manipulating 
the cues so as to change the construal, and hence the perceived expectations. Such manipulations 
may in principle make the experimental environment either more or less artificial (in the sense of 
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more or less similar to a familiar situation), but the “artificiality” need not have a direct impact on 
the degree of control that experimenters have over subjects’ expectations.  Elements that can be 
manipulated in the Dictator Game include, for example, the source of subjects’ endowments 
(“windfall” money) and the identity of the recipient (a randomly selected experimental subject). 
Such manipulation can have a tremendous impact on subjects’ behaviour (regardless of whether they 
make the experiment more or less familiar):  Cherry et al. (2002) for example have observed that 
95% of subjects donate nothing in a Dictator Game when the dictators earn the money by answering 
the questions of a GMAT quiz correctly. In another experiment, over 73% of the dictators gives 
money when the recipient is identified with a “reputable charity” like the Red Cross, and the average 
level of donations is tripled compared to an anonymous recipient condition (Eckel and Grossman, 
1996).16 
 
How can we explain this evidence? Bicchieri (2006), Levitt and List (2007) and Smith (2008) have 
argued that the key is to understand the complex nature of norm-driven behaviour. Subjects’ 
behaviour (and a fortiori, experimenter’s demand effects) may be guided by perceived normative 
expectations. But far from being an anomaly of “artificial” experiments, people’s sensitivity to 
norms is an extremely common and important behavioural phenomenon. The subject who does not 
share the money earned in a GMAT task is reacting to a familiar norm that assigns property rights 
over the resources that she has produced with her own labour. Similarly, the subject who gives 
money to the Red Cross reacts to a norm that prescribes to help people in need. And in both cases, 
the norm is likely to be shared with the experimenter and with the other subjects. An inference from 
lab to world would be externally valid, in these circumstances, because the subjects are reacting to 
the expectations of an audience (not in spite of it), given that the experimental audience is 
representative of other audiences found in real-life situations. 
 
                                                 
16  For other similar examples see e.g. Branas-Garza (2007) on the effect of making the passive role of the 
recipient salient; Krupka and Weber’s (2013) study of “giving” and “taking” frames; and Jakiela’s (2015) finding that 
subjects in rural Kenia react to a “status” cue but not to an “effort” cue. 
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If the behaviour observed in experiments is explained by compliance with norms, then tasks like the 
Dictator Game may be perfectly appropriate tools for the investigation of social behaviour. In order 
for this to be the case, however, the experimenter must achieve control on the main determinants of 
behaviour: she must understand what sort of norms may be triggered by what sort of cues, and what 
kind of audience is important for the subjects. When Cherry and his colleagues introduced the 
GMAT test, they were aware that they were manipulating a norm of asset legitimacy or private 
property. Similarly, Eckel and Grossman knew what they were doing when they indicated the Red 
Cross as the recipient of their Dictator Game. But experimental economists in general are not always 
aware of the methodological implications of experimenting with social norms. Such methodological 
awareness can be attained only if we shift the focus of attention from the control of individual 
preferences to the control of social norms. 
 
 
6 Controlling norms 
 
What is a norm, then, and how can it be controlled in the laboratory? When we say that “you ought 
to do” something, we usually intend that we expect you to do it even if you may have some reason 
to do otherwise. For example, if we say that you ought to be here at noon, we expect you to do it 
even if you have some reason to delay. If you tell us that you are going to be late because you want 
to take a nap in the park, we will probably not take it as a legitimate justification. We will be 
annoyed, and we will form a bad opinion of you.17 
 
A remarkable feature of norm-driven behaviour is this: the fact that you are expected to do 
something may also be a reason for you to do it. Cristina Bicchieri has proposed a definition of 
                                                 
17  This obviously holds for some reasons only: if you are late because you have been hit by a truck and required 
some medication, we will consider it a good justification. Which deviations from a norm are acceptable depends on the 
relative cost of compliance and the strength of the norm. 
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social norm that is able to capture this conditionality on expectations, and that we will use in this 
paper. A rule R, according to Bicchieri (2006), is a social norm in a population P if 
 
(a) the members of the group believe that a sufficiently large subset of P conforms to R in 
situations of type S, and either 
(b) they believe that a sufficiently large subset of P expects them to conform to R in situations 
of type S; or 
(b′) they believe that a sufficiently large subset of P expects them to conform to R in situations 
of type S, prefers them to conform, and may punish deviations from R. 
 
Notice that external reasons to conform (i.e. sanctions) are mentioned explicitly only in condition b′. 
When there is no expectation of punishment, therefore, non-conformity with expectations generates 
motivations that are internal to the decision-maker, for example in the form of a desire to please the 
audience. 
 
Bicchieri argues explicitly that norm-compliance is conditional on expectations, and that 
expectations are relative both to a population P and to a situation S. The so-called problem of 
“artificiality” then is often the problem of inferring R from S, a particularly tricky task when the 
subjects are unable to associate the experimental task with a familiar real-world task. But it is 
important to realize that “artificiality” and expectations may interact in various ways: on the one 
hand, because an unfamiliar design often sends fewer cues to the experimental subjects, it is 
arguably less likely to send cues inadvertently – that is, to create expectations that are uncontrolled 
by the experimenter. On the other hand, in the absence of a familiar cue the subjects may engage in 
wild speculations about the goal of the experiment or the expectations of the audience. A small 
detail of the design may be used by subjects to construe an idiosyncratic interpretation of the task, 
and in such cases there is a risk that the experimenter may lose control of the normative elements of 
the situation. 
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The behaviour triggered by experimental cues is in a very obvious and straightforward sense an 
experimenter’s demand effect in Zizzo’s sense. But the fact that norm-compliance has been induced 
by the experimenter (“artificially”, inevitably) does not necessarily invalidate the inferences that we 
make from the data. Quite the contrary: just as it makes good sense to induce preferences in some 
experimental circumstances, so it makes good sense to induce norm-driven behaviour in other 
experimental contexts. The important point is that the experimenter must retain full control over the 
experimental procedures – or, in other words, that the inferences drawn from the experimental data 
must not be confounded by any unintended effect of the experimental design. To retain experimental 
control the experimenter must be aware of the potential effects of any cues that may be implicit or 
explicit in the experimental design. She must be aware of the way in which a certain task may be 
classified, and of the possible association between the classification and any behavioural rule R. 
This in turn is possible only if the experimenter is acquainted with the cultural beliefs and 
expectations of the population from which the experimental subjects and their audience have been 
drawn. 
 
Some fascinating examples come from the experiments performed by anthropologists with 
populations that share different cultural norms from those that are prevalent in Western societies. 
Lesorogol (2007) for example reports that the Samburu, a group of nomadic pastoralists from 
Kenya, give the recipient roughly 40% of the endowment in a standard Dictator Game – an 
unusually generous behaviour compared to what is observed in Western countries. When the 
Dictator Game is framed as a “meat sharing” task, however, the modal offer decreases to 20%. 
During post-experimental interviews, the subjects explain that such a portion corresponds roughly to 
the size of a hind leg, which is considered the normatively appropriate donation when the carcass of 
a goat is shared among the Samburu.18 
 
                                                 
18  See also Ensminger (2004), Cronk (2007), Wiessner (2009), Gerkey (2013), Barr et al. (2015), Jakiela (2015). 
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The methodology followed in this experiment is entirely appropriate, given the goals of the research. 
The meat sharing task is framed in such a way as to elicit normatively appropriate behaviour, and in 
this sense the results may be considered “demand effects”. But the behaviour is not an “artefact” 
(quite the contrary) and the inferences are valid, because the experimenter retains control over the 
experimental manipulation. Validity depends on our capacity to make reliable inferences from the 





The methodological literature in experimental economics tends to associate artificial designs with 
lack of external validity and demand effects. In this paper we have argued that these three concepts 
are entangled in a complex fashion. Part of the problem is that the term “artificiality”, as it is used in 
the literature, refers to at least three different features of experiments, that ought to be kept distinct: 
(i) the fact that subjects are observed by an audience, (ii) the fact that they are placed in an 
unfamiliar situation and (iii) the fact that there is often only an approximate or analogical 
correspondence between the experimental setting and the target situation of interest. Once these 
three features are distinguished, we can see that there is no univocal relationship between 
artificiality, demand effects, and external validity; in some cases artificiality (understood as 
involving unfamiliar tasks or settings) can prevent biases associated to reactivity, since the key to 
retain experimental control is to understand the reaction of experimental subjects to the expectations 
of the other subjects and of the experimenter. 
 
Emphasising the role of reactivity, expectations, and the audience, helps identify some misguided 
solutions to the problem of external validity. Levitt and List (2007) for example promote field 
experiments as an antidote to the artificiality of designs such as the Dictator Game. But clearly we 
do not make expectations and audiences disappear just by running a field experiment. If there are 
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norms (and there often are) we must be aware of how the experimental manipulation may trigger 
cues and hence norm-driven behaviour. If we lose control over this aspect, we are going to derive 
invalid inferences regardless of whether the experiment is run in the laboratory or in the field. (In the 
field the consequences may actually be even worse, because we might feel justified in drawing 
policy conclusions that are in fact unwarranted.) 
 
As an example of valid inferences drawn from experimental data, we have mentioned the studies of 
social norms done by economists and anthropologists using “artificial” designs like the Dictator 
Game. Such studies do produce valid results when the experimenters retain control over the 
reactions of their subjects to the experimental cues. One important caveat is that the results are 
typically limited to a particular culture (meat sharing norms are not common among Western 
students, for example). This is the sort of validity that can be attained; but surely a valid local 
inference is more valuable than a mistaken universal inference, or than no inference at all. 
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